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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Be All That You Can Be, But Nothing More:
National Mining Association v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the
Corps' Critical Loss of Wetlands Control
MATTHEW

M. D'AMIco*

I. Introduction
In a detrimental blow to federal wetlands regulation, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(hereinafter "the Corps") had exceeded its authority under section
404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.1 The court determined that the Corps, by requiring permits
pursuant to the Tulloch Rule 2 for all dredging activities that
caused an "addition" of pollutants to navigable waters, had exceeded its authority because the rule considered incidental
fallback, which is the inevitable resettling of miniscule amounts of
material during dredging, to be an "addition" rather than a net
"withdrawal." In finding for the defendant, the National Mining
Association (hereinafter "NMA"), the D.C. Circuit held first that
the Tulloch Rule wrongfully disregarded the established exemption to the CWA's permit requirements of "de minimis, incidental
* A.B., 1997, Boston College; J.D., 2000, Pace University School of Law. The
author wishes to express his gratitude to the members of the Pace Environmental
Law Review whose hard work helped make this Case Note possible.
1. See National Mining Assn v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 145
F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinafter
"FWPCA"] § 404(a) (1972), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994). The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 are commonly referred to as the "Clean Water Act"
[hereinafter "CWA"I.
2. See 58 Fed. Reg. 450,008 (proposed Aug. 25, 1993). The Tulloch Rule is a 1993
rulemaking that altered the preexisting regulatory framework of section 404 by removing its de minimis exception and by adding incidental fallback. See discussion
infra Part II.
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soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations." 3
Second, the court held National Mining Association's facial challenge to the Tulloch Rule (i.e., that the rule is incompatible with
4
governing statutory law) was subject to the deferential Chevron
test, rather than a more stringent standard for facial challenges to
statutes. Such a stricter standard would require showing no "set
of circumstances exists under which the rule would be within the
Corps' statutory authority."5 Third, the court held the district
court, in exercising its broad discretion to award injunctive relief,
was not required to make explicit findings as to the elements necessary for a permanent injunction against the Corps' enforcement
of the Tulloch Rule, particularly in light of the district court's declaration that the rule was facially invalid. 6 Finally, the court held
that a national injunction against the enforcement of the Tulloch
Rule was appropriate in order to avoid a "flood of duplicative
7
litigation."
A persistent point of confusion in federal wetlands law concerns which activities in wetlands are lawful and which are unlawful. The CWA prohibits "discharges" of pollutants without, or
not in compliance with, a permit.8 When one fills a wetland with
dirt or other material, the action must be authorized by a section
404(a) permit which is issued by the Corps. A violation of section
404(a), therefore, contemplates a discharge of some kind. 9 The
Corps has long held it lacks the statutory authority under the Act
to regulate any wetlands-destroying activity other than the filling
covered by section 404(a). 10 Nevertheless, the Corps, in settling a
previous lawsuit regarding this issue,1" agreed to propose regulations controlling the draining of wetlands, which were finalized in

3.

145 F.3d at 1402 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,232 (1986)).

4. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
5.

145 F.3d at 1407.

6. See id. at 1408.
7. Id.
8. See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
9. See CWA § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
10. See MARGARET N. STRAND, Federal Wetlands Law: A Supplement, reprinted in
WETLANDS DESKBOOK, 2D EDITION 1 (Envtl. L. Inst. 1997).
11. See North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, Civ.No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO
(E.D.N.C. 1992).
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August 1993.12 These regulatory changes were quickly challenged
13
in federal district court, where they were struck down.
National Mining Ass'n poses a substantial setback to the
Corps and environmental groups seeking greater protection for
wetlands through stricter regulatory devices. 14 The case sheds
light on the limits of the Corps' regulatory power as a federal
agency, and on the serious need for clear legislative action in wetlands regulation to avoid the promulgation of questionable regulations by the Corps and other federal environmental agencies.
Such clear legislation is also sorely needed because federal wetlands law has been characterized as a "confused conglomeration of
several statutes, regulations, and agency policies lacking
uniformity."15
This Case Note intends to show how the District of Columbia
Circuit Court's rejection of the Tulloch Rule seriously damages the
Corps' ability to use the CWA to limit dredging activities in wetlands, streams and rivers. 16 The Tulloch Rule and similar regulations have, in many instances, been necessary because Congress
has failed to adequately legislate wetlands protection. Such necessity notwithstanding, the question remains: Was the D.C. Circuit Court correct in striking down the Tulloch Rule if the Rule
was inconsistent with the Corps' authority under the CWA? The
answer is yes. Courts are obliged to interpret law and not to create it, and the D.C. Circuit here followed the CWA as it is written
and intended. Part I of this Case Note will show how National
Mining Ass'n was rightly decided, with a certain exception the
court should possibly have followed.
Part II of this Case Note examines the development of federal
wetlands regulation under the CWA, including the reasons for regulating wetlands, and in particular, the statutory authority provided to the Corps. The Corps' role under section 404 of the Act is
discussed, since understanding its role is essential to properly an12. See 58 Fed. Reg. 450,008 (proposed Aug. 25, 1993). This is the so-called "Tulloch Rule," named after a party to the original lawsuit.
13. See American Mining Congress v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997).
14. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 1.
15. STRAND, supra note 10, at 4.

16. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1988). Historically, the Corps has had the authority to regulate dredging and filling activities in streams and rivers (i.e., "navigable
waters") under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, and to prohibit the
deposit of refuse into navigable waters without a permit under section 13 of the
amendments added by the Refuse Act of 1899. See id.

3
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alyzing the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling. Part II also discusses the
case law and regulations that have arisen out of the CWA, and
how they relate to and shape the Corps' section 404 powers. Part
III examines the facts, holding, and reasoning of the National
Mining Ass'n decision, including the arguments made by both parties. Part IV analyzes the court's decision in National Mining
Ass'n against the backdrop of the statutes, regulations, and cases
discussed in Part II, and shows that the court properly construed
the laws and precedent. Furthermore, Part IV considers whether
the power to regulate any redeposit (i.e., the power given the
Corps under the Tulloch Rule) is not more appropriately given by
Congress rather than developed by the Corps itself. Finally, Part
V concludes that the decision in National Mining Ass'n should
serve as a message to Congress demanding legislation that further protects wetlands, or expands the Corps' authority. The decision illustrates the judiciary's aversion to upholding regulations
that have no statutory basis, even if the result negatively impacts
the environment. Consequently, Congress must legislate a
solution.
II.
A.

Background

The Value of Protecting Wetlands

The ecological value of wetlands is often described by examples of their benefits to water quality; as wildlife habitats; as conveyances for floodwater; and as barriers to erosion and
resedimentation. 17 "Wetlands are among the most important of
natural features to environmentalists and businesses alike." 18 To
environmentalists, wetlands constitute "irreplaceable areas of biological . . . diversity," valued for their wildlife productivity, aesthetic properties, and as recreational sites. 19 To businesses and
private landowners, wetlands inhibit the development of vast areas of privately owned land. 20 Consequently, wetlands regulation
arises in the context of private property management, which involves balancing the public's interest in the many ecological bene17. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 5. Wetlands are the swamps, marshes, and wet
areas that make up a substantial amount of our nation's land. See id.
18. Michael B. Gerrard, Tumult in Federal Wetlands Regulation, 220 N.Y. L.J. 3
(1998).
19. Id.
20. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 5.
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fits of wetlands against the substantial rights of the private
21
property owner.
B.

Statutory Background to the Tulloch Rule
1.

Legislative History

The conflict, which pits private property management against
public interest, is reflected in the federal laws that protect wetlands. There is no uniformity in federal wetlands regulation and
no single federal wetlands law. 2 2 Instead of developing a comprehensive wetlands law, Congress has inserted wetlands provisions
into laws that primarily target other concerns, such as water pollution, agricultural production, fish and wildlife habitat, and certain federal benefits programs. 23 Existing federal law does not
address the abatement of the loss of wetlands, as the political and
legal debates over wetlands continue to flourish. 24 Though com25
prehensive wetlands legislation has been proposed in Congress,
the primary statute that regulates activities in wetlands today is
26
still the CWA.
The CWA was promulgated upon its nineteenth century predecessors. 2 7 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has long had the
authority to improve and promote navigation of waterways. 28 Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, authorizes the Corps to regulate dredging and filling activities in navigable waters, 29 while
30
section 13 prohibits the deposit of refuse without a permit.
Though the focus of the Rivers and Harbors Act was not originally
on water pollution control but rather on navigation, it nevertheless evolved into a tool to regulate water pollution based on its
21. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 5.
22. See Gerrard, supra note 18, at 3.
23. See, e.g., CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); The Food Security
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3862 (1985); The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (1988); The National Food Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988).
24. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 5.
25. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1330, 102d Cong., 1"s Sess. (1991).
26. See CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
27. See STRAND, supra note 10, at 7 (referring to the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1890, and the Refuse Act of 1899).
28. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426, 453-54 (1890), and
the amendments added by the Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1988) (collectively, "The Rivers and Harbors

Act")).
29. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
30. See id. at § 407.
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prohibition against permitless discharge of "refuse."3 1 In this
manner, in the 1960s, industrial water pollution came under the
32
Corps' authority.
A truly comprehensive attempt to regulate water pollution
was not made until Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972. 3 3 Known as the "Clean Water
Act," the statute embraced as its objective the restoration and
maintenance of the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation's waters." 3 4 In order to achieve these goals, section
301(a) provides that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful" 35 except in compliance with sections 402 and
404 of the Act. 3 6 The CWA defines any "discharge of pollutants" to
include "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source,"37 and also defines "navigable waters" as waters
of the United States.3 8 The term "waters of the United States," in
turn, has been interpreted to include "traditional navigable waters, their tributaries, and adjacent wetlands . . ... 39 Consequently, wetlands fall within the boundaries of the CWA and
40
particularly within the scope of section 404.
2.

Section 404

Section 404 of the CWA is the principal source of federal wetlands regulatory authority, since it gives the Corps power to require permits for discharge of dredge or fill material. 4 1 Section
404 is administered jointly by the Corps and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA"), and authorizes the
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue permits
allowing the "discharge" at "specific disposal sites."4 2 The Corps
has the main regulatory authority over discharges of fill based on
the Corps' prior experience administering the Rivers and Harbors
Act, and controlling navigation and other dredging. 4 3 However,
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at § 407.
See STRAND, supra note 10, at 7.
See CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
See CWA §§ 301(a), 402, 404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1344.
CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
33 C.F.R. § 328 (1996).
See CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
See id.
Id.
See STRAND, supra note 10, at 8.
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the EPA retains a highly controversial veto power over the Corps'
permits if it determines that the discharge of fill material would
"have an unacceptable effect on municipal water supplies ....
wildlife, or recreational areas." 44 Furthermore, the Fish and
Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service have
the authority to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
45
wetlands.
3.

The 1986 Corps Rule

In 1986, the Corps issued a regulation which defined the
phrase "discharge of dredged material" in section 404 to exclude
"incidental movement of dredged material occurring during normal dredging operations." 46 The Corps explained that mere
"fallback" of dredged material (e.g., bucket drippings) from "nor47
mal dredging operations" would generally not require a permit.
However, if the displaced material were more than de minimis
and "disposed of' in water, a permit would be required. 48 While
the regulation did not define "normal dredging operations," its
preamble gave some guidance as to the de minimis exception's
coverage:
Section 404 clearly directs the Corps to regulate the discharge
of dredged material, not the dredging itself. Dredging operations
cannot be performed without some fallback. However, if we were
to define this fallback as a "discharge of dredged material," we
would, in effect, be adding the regulation of dredging to section
49
404 which we do not believe was the intent of Congress.
Therefore, the Corps' power would arise only where the
fallback is something more than "incidental" fallback.
4.

The Tulloch Rule

The controversy over whether "discharge" included the inevitable side effect of most dredging, "incidental fallback," did not
44. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
45. See Michael Lenetsky, President Clinton and Wetlands Regulation: Boon or
Bane to the Environment?, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 81 (1994). All four agencies
have created their own systems of policies, guidelines and practices regarding wetlands, and confusion has often resulted because of these separate regulatory actions
by the agencies. See id. at 84.
46. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(ii) (1990).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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end with the 1986 regulations. In 1992, in a case called North
Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, 50 environmental groups
challenged a developer's efforts to drain and clear 700 acres of
wetlands in North Carolina. 5 1 The developer had decided to dig
drainage ditches to "dry up" the wetlands on the 700-acre site, and
then to fill them indiscriminately once they were dry and no
longer subject to the CWA. 5 2 To evade regulation, the developer
removed most of the dredged material from the ditches to upland,
discharging only a relatively small portion of it back into the wetlands. 5 3 Under the previous Corps policy, these relatively small
discharges did not trigger regulation, so the developer was able to
proceed with the massive destruction of the 700 acres of
wetlands .54
The settlement agreement reached in Tulloch called for the
EPA and the Corps to propose new rules governing the permit requirements under section 404 of the CWA for "land-clearing and
excavation activities." 55 Adoption of the Tulloch Rule, as it came
to be known, eliminated the 1986 "de minimis" exception, and
placed "incidental" fallback or "redeposit" of dredged material
within the Corps' permit jurisdiction. 56 The Tulloch Rule prevented any activity that altered the waters of the United States to
such an extent that they could no longer be considered waters by
redefining the definition of pollutant that occurred during dredg57
ing or piling activities.
C.

Subsequent Case Law to the Tulloch Rule
1. "Discharge" Cases

A substantial body of case law has arisen from the CWA and
the Corps' authority to regulate under section 404.58 These cases
not only help delineate the Corps' authority, they help to deter50. Civ. No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992).
51. See Gerrard, supra note 18, at 3.

52. See Civ. No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Gerrard, supra note 18, at 3.
56. See 58 Fed. Reg. 450,008 (Aug. 25, 1993).
57. See Lenetsky, supra note 45, at 89-90.
58. See, e.g., Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8 th Cir.
1979); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5 th Cir. 1983); United
States v. M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d 1501 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1985); Rybachek v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 904 F.2d 1276 ( 9 t h Cir. 1990); Dubois v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996); North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit Court discussed and relied
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mine what constitutes "discharge," "addition," "withdrawal," and
"redeposit."
In Minnehaha Creek Watershed Districtv. Hoffman, 59 a group
of plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against regulatory jurisdiction asserted by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers over a lake and its outlet. 60 The United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota permanently
enjoined the Corps from asserting its regulatory jurisdiction over
the lake, and over the placement of riprap and the construction of
61
dams on the lake.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the lake constituted "navigable water" within
the meaning of the CWA.6 2 More importantly, the court held that
both dams and riprap in navigable waters are "discharges." By
broadly defining "pollutant" under the Act, the court reasoned a
dam's introduction into a lake or river constituted "the man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological,
and radiological integrity of water," which was Congress' intent to
63
regulate.
Similarly, the issue of discharge arose in Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh.6 4 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana had enjoined landowners
from any additional clearing, except by permit, of certain lands
determined by the district court to constitute wetlands.6 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part, holding that the district court had erred
in substituting its own wetlands determination for EPA's final
wetlands determination. 6 6 The court held that a wetlands determination has limited judicial review and "is entitled to ...a standard of review [that] is highly deferential." 6 7 The district court,
while empowered to make a "searching and careful" inquiry, nevertheless "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
on these cases in National Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs concerning "discharges."
59.

597 F.2d 617 (8 th Cir. 1979).

60.
61.
62.
63.

See
See
See
597

id.
id. at 620-621.
id. at 624.
F.2d at 625 (1972) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19)).

64. 715 F.2d 897 (5 th Cir. 1983).

65. See id.
66. See id. at 907.
67. Id. at 907, 904.

9

334

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the agency," when the agency's final wetlands determination is
68
not "arbitrary" or "capricious."
The Fifth Circuit also held that the district court had not
erred in concluding that the landowners' land-clearing activities,
which resulted in significant digging up of earth and leveling of
land, were subject to the Corps' permit requirement. 69 By plaintiffs tearing up "large chunks of earth," the district court could
have properly decided through eyewitness testimony that "discharges" had occurred. 70 The court reasoned that, as section
502(12) of the CWA defines "discharge" as any "addition of pollutant to the waters of the U.S.," and dredged material necessarily
comes from the water, such a substantial "redeposit" has to consti71
tute a discharge.
Courts have held that, even when the dredging activities were
not intentional, the parties causing the redeposit have violated
section 404 if they do not have a permit. 72 In United States v.
M.C.C. of Florida, Inc.,73 the United States, on behalf of the
Corps, brought a civil action against a corporation for violations of
the Rivers and Harbors Act 7 4 and the CWA following the corporation's construction of a bridge in the Florida Keys. 75 The corporation had originally received permits from the Corps for truck
transportation during construction, but just before construction,
the corporation decided to use barges and did not inform the Corps
of the change. As a result, no environmental impact study was
76
done concerning the barges, and no permits were given for them.
The barges' propellers caused dredging of vegetation and sediment from the ocean bottom, which settled on adjacent sea grass
beds. 77 The Corps issued a cease and desist order, which the corporation ignored. 78 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida ordered the corporation to pay
$200,000 for "restoration projects," and to pay $20,000 as a civil
9
penalty. 7
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 904.
See 715 F.2d at 922.
See id.
See id.
See United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501
Id.

(11th

Cir. 1985).

74. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1988).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See
See

772 F.2d at 1502.
id. at 1503.
id. at 1504.
id. at 1505.
id. at 1507.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
affirming in part and reversing in part, held that the corporation
had violated both statutes, was not entitled to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
had been properly ordered to pay the penalties.8 0 The court
agreed with the district court's finding that the corporation "willfully violated" the Rivers and Harbors Act when it "knowingly created [a] propeller-dredged channel," which is an excavation in
violation of section 403.81 The corporation made over 112 trips
with the barges, even after it was served with the cease and desist
82
order.
Furthermore, the court held the activities violated the CWA
as a "discharge of a pollutant."8 3 Since the CWA's objective, in section 101, "is to restore and maintain the ... physical. . . integrity
of the Nation's waters," and the resettled dredged material was
really a redeposit that damaged such integrity, the dredged material constituted an "addition" within the meaning of "discharge. '8 4
The Eleventh Circuit thus moved its standard closer to the
future Tulloch Rule definition, that seemingly any redeposit could
85
be a discharge under the Act.
Courts have continuously shown deference to the Corps and
the EPA in their interpretations of "discharge of pollutants" under
the CWA.8 6 In Rybachek v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, petitioners challenged EPA's authority to regulate
gold mining under the CWA.8 7 In a long and complex decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
placer mining was subject to the CWA, which charged the EPA
with developing comprehensive programs to prevent the discharge
of any pollutant except in compliance with the Act.88 The court,
examining placer mining, determined "placer mines excavate the
dirt and gravel in and around waterways, extract any gold, and
discharge the dirt and any non-gold material into the water."8 9
80. See 772 F.2d at 1501.
81. Id. at 1505.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1506.
84. Id.
85. See 58 Fed. Reg. 450,008 (Aug. 25, 1993).
86. See Rybachek v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1284
(9th Cir. 1990). Most of the case is beyond the scope of this discussion.
87. 904 F.2d at 1276.
88. See id. at 1285.
89. Id.

11
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Congress defined "discharge" as any "addition... to navigable waters from any point source," including, presumably, the streambed
itself, and defined "pollutant" as "dredged . . . rock, sand, [and]
cellar dirt . ... 90 The court thus reasoned that "'pollutant'...
encompasses the materials segregated from gold in placer mining," and that resuspension of those materials, even though from
the streambed itself, "may be interpreted as an addition under the
Act."9 1 The court viewed the "redeposit" as a "discrete act... [ofl
regulable discharge," a significant distinction from incidental
92
fallback.
Following the addition of the Tulloch Rule, some federal circuit courts have distanced themselves from the notion that redeposit necessarily meant addition to constitute a discharge, and
have held that incidental fallback represented a "net withdrawal,"
not an addition, of a material, and could not be a discharge. 9 3 In
North Carolinav. FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a petition by the State of North Carolina seeking review of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (hereinafter
"FERC") decision to amend its license to the City of Virginia
Beach, Virginia, which allowed the City to build an intake structure within a power project's boundaries and withdraw water for
transport to Virginia Beach. 94 At issue was a seventy-six mile
pipeline originating in Lake Gaston and terminating in Norfolk,
Virginia. 9 5 Lake Gaston is a "navigable waterway" within the
meaning of the CWA, traversing the states of Virginia and North
Carolina. 9 6 Virginia Beach received a section 404 permit from the
Corps for the dredge and fill operation in Virginia, as the pipeline
would cause the "addition" of discharged "redeposit" from North
Carolina in Virginia. 97 Virginia Beach also had FERC amend its
license for the withdrawal of water from North Carolina. 98 The
State of North Carolina petitioned against the amendment, arguing that the removal of the water would cause discharge and rede90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 904 F.2d at 1285.
93. See North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); see also Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir.
1996).
94. See North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d at 1180.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1181.
98. See id.
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posit which had to be permitted under section 404, and approved
under section 401 by North Carolina.99
The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that neither the withdrawal of the water from the lake nor the sediment displaced "results in a discharge." 10 0 The court reasoned that the "definitional
intent of Congress reflects . . .that the word 'discharge' contemplates the addition, not the withdrawal, of a substance or substances." 10 1 In the present case, only the redeposit in Virginia
constituted an addition, and it was properly permitted under section 404.102 By contrast, the court reasoned, the removal of water
and sediment settlement in North Carolina constituted a "withdrawal," Congress did not intend to regulate in promulgating the
Act.103

Consequently, the D.C. Circuit articulated the distinction between an addition and a withdrawal that would be essential to the
final outcome in the National Mining Ass'n case.
2.

Facial Challenge Standards for Agency Regulations and
Statutes

Agency regulations can be challenged by a petition for review
to the appropriate court, and in certain cases, they have been challenged. 10 4 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, petitioners filed for review of an EPA regulation allowing
states to treat all "pollution-emitting devices within [the] same industrial grouping as though they were encased within [the same]
'bubble"' based on construction of the term "stationary source" in
the Clean Air Act, section 111(a)(3). 10 5 The United States Supreme Court noted that Congress failed to explicitly define the
Clean Air Act's "stationary source," and that the legislative history did not squarely address the issue. 10 6 When a court reviews
99. See 112 F.3d at 1182-83.
100. Id. at 1187.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (challenge to EPA regulation); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (challenge to Secretary of Health and Human Services' regulations); Health Ins. Ass'n of
America, Inc., v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994); cf United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987) (challenge to Bail Reform Act [statute] authorization of pretrial
detention).
105. 467 U.S. at 2778.
106. Id. at 2779.
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an agency's construction of the statute it administers, the Supreme Court has stated,
[the court] is confronted with two questions. First . . . is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for [all] ... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construc10 7
tion of the statute.
Consequently, the Court held the EPA's definition of "stationary source" was a permissible construction of the statutory
term. 0 8 The Court reasoned that Congress' explicit "gap" in the
legislation "is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." 10 9
Here, the agency filled such a gap. 11 0 The Supreme Court, however, provided a very pertinent caveat: "The judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." 1 1
Despite such deference shown to an administrative rule in
Chevron, the Supreme Court has had little trouble striking down a
regulation when it violates its statutory authority.1 12 At issue in
Sullivan v. Zebley were regulations of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services that determined whether a child was disabled for
purposes of receipt of supplemental security income benefits
under the Social Security Act. 1 3 Under the Act, a child "is entitled to supplemental security income benefits if his impairment is
as severe as one that would prevent an adult from working." 1 4
Under the challenged regulations, a child who could not show that
his impairment "matched or was equal to a listed impairment"
107. Id. at 2781-82.
108. See id. at 2779.
109. Id. at 2782.
110. See 467 U.S. at 2782.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
113. See id. at 521.
114. Id. at 529 (quoting Social Security Act § 1614(a)(3)(A),(B),
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A),(B) (1994)).
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was denied benefits, however, an adult who could not show his
impairment matched or was equal nevertheless could still qualify
for benefits if he could show he could not engage in past work or
1 15
other work, "given his age, education, and work experience."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment,
which was vacated by the Court of Appeals for the Third
116
Circuit.
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming, held that the
social security regulations violated the Social Security Act, because under the regulations a child could suffer from a comparable impairment to one that would render an adult disabled, but
not classify as disabled. 1 7 The Court reasoned that the fact that
some of the child disability listings under the social security regulations included functional criteria, did not overcome the facial
challenge: "[Al facial challenge is a proper response to the systemic disparity between the statutory standard and [the regulations'] approach to child disability claims."1 1 8
The Zebley court thus set a standard for facial challenges of
administrative regulations. Even if there are clearly valid applications of the regulation, courts will uphold facial challenges if there
are also some applications that could violate the statutory
mandate.119
In Health Ins. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Shalala,120 certain
health insurers challenged new Medicare regulations implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services. 12 ' At
issue were certain amendments to Medicare, codified and referred
to as the "Medicare as Secondary Payer" statute, 122 and the regulations that derived from the statute. 12 3
Turning to consideration of the facial challenge issue, the
D.C. Circuit conceded that the statute was ambiguous, and that
reviewing the agency's construction of an ambiguous statute
4
would essentially mean reviewing the agency's policy judgment. 12
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 535-36.
See id. at 521.
See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
See id.
23 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
See 23 F.3d at 415.
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (1984).
See 23 F.3d at 414.
See id. at 416.
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Although such judgments are generally "entitled to judicial deference,"112 5 the court stated "we cannot accept them if they seem
wholly unsupported or if they conflict with the policy judgments
that undergird the statutory scheme."'1 2 6 Thus, the Chevron test
would apply only after showing that the agency's interpretation
1 27
"is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.
By contrast, courts have been less inclined to invalidate statutes through facial challenges than administrative rules. 128 In
United States v. Salerno,129 defendants challenged the Bail Reform Act,' 3 0 which subjected them to pretrial detention based on
the district judge's determination of defendants' "future dangerousness." 13 1 Defendants appealed their pretrial detention to the
13 2
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and won.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
decision, holding that the Act was constitutional. 33 Looking at
the legislative intent, the Court held that the Act did not violate
substantive due process, was not an impermissible punishment
before trial, and was carefully limited to the most serious crimes.
"The legislative history of the . . .Act clearly indicates . . .the
pretrial detention provisions [are not] punishment for dangerous
individuals.... There is no doubt that preventing danger to the
community is [the] legitimate regulatory goal." 13 4 Defendants
thus failed to carry their burden, the underlying principle of the
case. A facial challenge to the "validity of a legislative act must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act
135
is valid."
3.

"Discretion and Breadth of Injunctive Relief' Cases

Injunctions are court-ordered restraints on action or speech,
sometimes interim, sometimes permanent, but always restrictive
of a person's ability to do some specified act.' 3 6 Consequently, in125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id., citing Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir 1991).
Id.
Id., citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1984).
481 U.S. at 739.
See id.
See id. at 745.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 745.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 ( 6 th ed. 1990).
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junctions have been challenged as judicial abuses of discretion.1 3 7
In Wagner v. Taylor,138 appellant "sued for interim injunctive relief to prevent his employer's retaliation while he pursued a Title
VII civil rights claim."'1 39 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia denied the injunctive request, concluding
that on the facts presented, no ground for an injunction existed:
"[T]here is no clear indication that [appellant] has experienced reprisal . . .or that he will experience any interference . . .in the
future." 140 Appellant then argued the district court had abused its
141
discretion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, holding that district courts "have broad discretion to evaluate the irreparability of alleged harm and to make
determinations regarding the propriety of injunctive relief."1 4 2 To
overcome that, the appellant "carries the heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion."1 4 3 The court concluded that, as
the district court had found previously, the "facts fail[ed] to require . . . intervention," 144 and so the prior decision was
"unassailable."145
The case of Baeder v. Heckler 146 presented a different situation, where plaintiff challenged an administrative regulation that
had denied his application for disability benefits under the Social
Security Act. 14 7 The United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey invalidated the regulation as it applied to plaintiff,
and went further, enjoining the Secretary of Health and Human
48
Services from using the regulation in any other case.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with the regulation's
invalidation as applied to plaintiff, but disagreeing with a nation137. See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990); Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1985).
138. 836 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 569.
141. See id. at 570.
142. Id. at 576.
143. 836 F.2d at 576.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 768 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1985).
147. See id. at 548.
148. See id. at 550.
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wide injunction. 149 The court held that the application of the regulation to plaintiff did not "conform to the statutory mandate,"
and therefore was invalid. 150 However, the court refused to affirm
the "all-encompassing" injunction: "We do not believe ... that in
the context of [plaintiffs] claim for disability benefits, the district
court had the authority to issue an injunction aimed at controlling
15 1
the Secretary's behavior in every disability case in the country."
For the Third Circuit, an injunction for plaintiffs individual benefit would have been appropriate, but a nationwide injunction was
far too sweeping in its effect, and therefore, could not be
permitted.152
National Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of
53
Engineers
A. Facts
The plaintiffs in National Mining Ass'n were various trade as54
sociations whose members engaged in dredging and excavation.1
The plaintiffs mounted a challenge to the Tulloch Rule, claiming
that it exceeded the scope of the Corps' authority under the CWA's
section 404 by regulating incidental fallback during dredging operations as a "discharge."155 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia agreed with the plaintiffs, and granted
summary judgment invalidating the Tulloch Rule.' 56 Additionally, the district court enjoined the Corps and the EPA from enforcing the Tulloch Rule anywhere in the United States. 15 7 The
Corps appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
158
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
III.

Appellants' Arguments
The Corps argued that the terms of the CWA demonstrated
that fallback might be classified as a discharge. 59 The Act deB.

149. See id. at 553.
150. Id.
151. 768 F.2d at 553.
152. Id.
153. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
154. See id. at 1401.
155. See id. The lower court case, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, was American Mining Congress v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997). See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1400.
159. See Brief of Appellant (Corps) at 2, National Mining Ass'n v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/3

18

2000]

BE ALL THAT YOU CAN BE

343

fined a discharge as the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters, and defined "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil," as well as
"rock, sand, and cellar dirt."160 The Corps, in turn, defined
"dredged material" as "material that is excavated or dredged from
the waters of the United States." 16 1 Thus, according to the Corps,
wetland soil, debris or sediment during dredging "becomes a pollutant" for purposes of the Act. 162 If a portion of the material being
dredged were to fall back into the water, it would constitute an
addition of a pollutant, the regulation of which was required by
16 3
the Act.
The Corps maintained that National Mining Association's
(hereinafter "NMA") argument that no addition of a pollutant occurred when indigenous material was redeposited had been consistently rejected by most federal appellate courts. 6 4 The cases
have held that the agencies have reasonably interpreted "addition" to include "redeposit" of dredged material taken from waters
of the United States back into those waters. 165 In no case, the
Corps continued, was there any indication that the courts considered the precise spatial relationship between the dredging activity
and the redeposit site to be significant, let alone that such spatial
considerations would set limits on the agencies' authority under
the CWA. 16 6 On the contrary, the federal appellate courts have
emphasized the harmful environmental effects in each particular
case, and deferred to the agencies' statutory interpretation. 167
Appellant National Wildlife Federation (hereinafter "NWF")
argued that the district court's understanding of "addition" effec168
tively read the regulation of dredged material out of the Act.
NWF noted that since dredged material came from the waters of
the United States, any discharge of such material could technically be described as a "redeposit," and cited Avoyelles Sports70
man's League v. Marsh16 9 for that proposition.
160. Id. at 1403.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See Brief of Appellant (Corps) at 7, National Mining Ass'n v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
165. See id. (citing Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923-24; M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d at
1506; Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1286).
166. See id. at 8.
167. See id.
168. See 145 F.3d at 1405.
169. 715 F.2d 897 ( 5 th Cir. 1983).
170. See 145 F.3d at 1405 (citing Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 924).
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The Corps again argued that Rybachek v. United States Envtl.
ProtectionAgency 17 1 stood for the proposition that material taken
from the water itself, if resuspended in the water, could be interpreted as an addition of pollutant under the Act. 17 2 Therefore, the
Corps argued, extraction accompanied by incidental fallback of
1 73
dirt and gravel constituted "addition of pollutant."
Next, the Corps argued that the facial challenge to the Tulloch Rule should have been evaluated under the strict standard of
United States v. Salerno, 74 which involved a facial challenge to a
statute, rather than the more lenient standard of Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc., v. NaturalRecourses Defense Council,175 which set the standard for administrative regulation challenges. 7 6 Lastly, the
Corps challenged the district court's grant of nationwide injunctive relief, challenging both the district court's discretion and the
breadth of the injunction. 177
C.

Appellees' Arguments

NMA argued that the Tulloch Rule exceeded the Corps' statutory jurisdiction under section 404.178 NMA "argued that fallback,
which returns dredged material virtually to the spot from which it
179
came, cannot be said to constitute an addition of anything."
Therefore, NMA contended, the Tulloch Rule conflicted with the
CWA's "unambiguous terms and cannot even survive the deferential scrutiny called for by Chevron."8 0 The Salerno test could not
apply, because the Tulloch Rule was an administrative rule unde8
serving of statutory protection.'1
Finally, NMA maintained that the injunction was within the
district court's discretion, as articulated in Wagner v. Taylor. 8 2
Concerning the breadth of the injunction, NMA cited Harmon v.
84
Thornburghi8 3 and Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
171. 904 F.2d 1276 ( 9 th Cir. 1990).

172. See 145 F.3d at 1406 (see Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1276).
173. Id.
174. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

175. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
176. See 145 F.3d at 1406-07 (see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739; Chevron, 467 U.S. at
837).

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See
See
Id.
Id.,
See
See
878

id. at 1408-09.
id. at 1403.
referring to Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
145 F.3d at 1407 (referring to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739).
id. at 1408 (referring to Wagner, 836 F.2d at 575).
F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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"When a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are
unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated - not
18 5
that their application to the individual petitioner is proscribed."
D.

The D.C. Circuit Court's Holding and Reasoning

The D.C. Circuit agreed with NMA, holding that the
"straightforward statutory term 'addition' cannot reasonably be
said to encompass the situation in which material is removed from
the waters of the United States and a small portion of it happens
to fall back." 18 6 Referring to North Carolina v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n,187 since "incidental fallback represents a net
withdrawal, not an addition, of material, it can not be a discharge
[within the meaning of the CWA]. '"188 The court disagreed with
the Corps argument that fallback constituted an "addition of any
pollutant," because material became a pollutant only upon dredging.1 8 9 "Regardless of any legal metamorphosis that may occur at
the moment of dredging, we fail to see how there can be an addition of dredged material when there is no addition of material."1 90
The court distinguished Avoyelles (holding that the Corps could
legally regulate some forms of redeposit under section 404) stating
that "by asserting jurisdiction over any redeposit, including incidental fallback, the Corps outran its statutory authority with the
Tulloch Rule."' 9 ' The D.C. Circuit found neither United States v.
M.C.C. of Florida,Inc., 19 2 nor Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agriculture 9 3 persuasive, holding the Tulloch Rule entirely too overreaching, encompassing incidental fallback and a wide range of
activities that "cannot remotely be said to 'add' anything to the
waters of the United States."' 94 The court noted Rybachek as the
Corps' strongest authority, but ultimately distinguished it, finding
that Rybachek did not hold that "extraction accompanied by incidental fallback of dirt and gravel constituted addition of a pollutant, but instead it identified the regulable discharge as the
184. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
185. 145 F.3d at 1409 (citing Harmon, 878 F.2d at 495; Lujan, 497 U.S. at 871).
186. Id. at 1404.
187. 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
188. 145 F.3d at 1404 (referring to North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 112 F.3d at 1187).
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1405.
192. 772 F.2d 1501 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1985).
193. 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
194. 145 F.3d at 1405.
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discrete act of dumping leftover material into the stream after it
had been processed." 19 5
On the facial challenge issue, the D.C. Circuit held that the
Salerno test did not apply, as the Tulloch Rule is an agency regulation, not a statute. 19 6 Instead, the Chevron standard applied,
and the district court was correct if it believed the Corps had acted
97
beyond its statutory mandate, which it had.
Lastly, the court held that a nationwide injunction was within
the district court's discretion. 198 The D.C. Circuit noted that,
under Wagner, "district courts enjoy broad discretion in awarding
injunctive relief."199 Here, "the district court was well within its
discretion in finding that the complaint placed the agencies on no'20 0
tice that NMA sought both declaratory and injunctive relief.
Concerning the breadth of the injunction, the D.C. Circuit held
that such breadth was required by Harmon and Lujan. "[I]f the
plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is invalidated, not
simply that the court forbids its application to a particular individual."20 ' The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the nationwide injunc20 2
tion would obviate a "flood of duplicative litigation."
Additionally, the court distinguished Baeder v. Heckler,20 3 finding
that it "did not involve a facial challenge to the validity of a regulation; the Third Circuit there held simply that a sweeping injunction would not be a proper remedy in the context of [an individual
20 4
plaintiffs] claim for disability benefits."
In conclusion, the D.C. Circuit stated that Congress was the
appropriate body to effectuate such a change in wetlands regulation, and thus, the Corps did not have the power to alter the
CWA. 20 5 Therefore, the Act could not accommodate the Tulloch
20 6
Rule.
195. Id. at 1406.
196. See id. at 1406-07.
197. See id. at 1407. The court cited Zebley, 493 U.S. at 521, in support of the
Chevron standard. See id.
198. See 145 F.3d at 1408-09.
199. Id. at 1408.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1409 (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 913).
202. Id.
203. 768 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1985).
204. 145 F.3d at 1409 (citing Baeder, 768 F.2d at 553).
205. See id. at 1410.
206. See id.
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IV.

Analysis: The D.C. Circuit's "Correct" Approach

In arriving at its decision, the National Mining Ass'n court
considered the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act to better
comprehend the scope of the authority provided to the Corps. In
so doing, it distinguished much of the precedent related to wetlands regulation. However, much of the case law distinguished by
the D.C. Circuit was decided prior to introduction of the Tulloch
Rule, and therefore did not explicitly relate to that particular aspect of the Corps' authority. Determining the plain meaning of
"addition" to mean an addition of something, the court could not
allow the Corps' regulatory power to be all-encompassing by interpreting addition and redeposit as whatever the Corps saw fit. Incidental fallback is a practically inescapable by-product of all
dredging activity. As the court aptly put it: "Congress could not
have contemplated that the attempted removal of 100 tons of
[dredged material] could constitute an addition simply because
7
only ninety-nine tons of it were actually taken away."20
However, some of the case law supports the notion that the
Tulloch Rule, or something approaching it, is a permissible regulation under the CWA. For example, the Eleventh Circuit declared in M.C.C. of Florida, Inc. that the CWA's objective was to
maintain the integrity of the nation's waters, and that any resettled dredged material violated that integrity so as to constitute an
"addition" within the meaning of "discharge."20 8
The D.C. Circuit understood the case law related to section
404(a), and determined the Tulloch Rule was simply far too overbroad: Minnehaha Creek concerned dams added to waterways,
which are considerable "additions" that in no way resemble incidental fallback; 20 9 Avoyelles dealt with the intentional tearing up
of large chunks of earth, which through eyewitness testimony was
determined to be a "discharge";2 10 Rybachek concerned gold mining, with "redepositing" found to have been a discrete act of adding
a discharge highly distinguishable from incidental fallback. 2 1 1
North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, the D.C.
Circuit's own standard for "additions" and "withdrawals," the
court held that the mere resettling of displaced sediment cannot
207. Id. at 1404.
208. 772 F.2d 1501 ( 1 1th Cir. 1985).
209. 597 F.2d 617 ( 8 th Cir. 1978).
210. 715 F.2d 897 ( 5 th Cir. 1983).

211. 904 F.2d 1276

(9 th

Cir. 1989).
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result in a "discharge," because discharge must constitute an "ad2 12
dition" and not a "withdrawal."
Balancing the weight of the case law, the D.C. Circuit properly determined that precedent, both in its own circuit and
throughout the country, required it to invalidate the Tulloch
Rule. 2 13 Similarly, the court had to follow the precedent of Chevron, Sullivan and Shalala, concerning the standard for facial challenges to an agency regulation. These cases required the D.C.
Circuit to invalidate the Tulloch Rule despite any valid applications it may have had under the CWA, because its invalid applications automatically crippled the entire rule. Salerno was
inapplicable because it dealt with a statutory facial challenge
21 4
rather than a regulatory facial challenge.
Did the court have to permanently enjoin the Corps, on a nationwide scale, from ever using the Tulloch Rule? The answer is
yes. Following the precedent of Wagner, Harmon, Lujan, and
Baeder, the D.C. Circuit rightly decided that an injunction had to
be sweeping in scope and it had to be permanent. 2 15 In this manner, and only in this manner, the court could avoid the duplicative
litigation against the Tulloch Rule that would inevitably occur as
a result of the decision.
Strict adherence to statutory mandates is important to the
continued legitimacy of our system of laws, but in National Mining Ass'n, the D.C. Circuit was perhaps too limiting in its consideration of the Corps' power under the CWA. 2 16 Essential to a
consideration of perceived statutory authority is an understanding of the potential harms and benefits of exceeding a statutory
mandate. 217 The Tulloch Rule was not a dangerous abuse of
power on the Corps' part, but an important loophole-plugging rule
that prevented land developers from destroying hundreds of acres
of wetlands and miles of streams with few constraints or second
218
thoughts for what it meant to people and wildlife.
Nevertheless, the Tulloch Rule was overreaching in its application, as National Mining Ass'n revealed. Such incidental
fallback could not be said to be a true addition of anything, and it
212.
213.
214.
215.
1997).
216.
217.
218.

112 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
See id.
481 U.S. 739 (1998).
North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir.
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See id.
See id.
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would be a stretch to liken it even to the redeposit found in
Rybachek, which was regulable by the Corps under the CWA even
before the introduction of the Tulloch Rule. 2 19 In striking down
the Tulloch Rule, the D.C. Circuit Court did not say how far the
Corps' power to protect wetlands and other waterways would be
2 20
cut back.
Turning to the question of the appropriate facial challenge
standard, the D.C. Circuit's consideration was less clearly proper.
The cases discussed suggested that the proper standard in the
present situation was the Chevron test, since the Tulloch Rule was
a regulation, not a statute. Statutes deserve considerably more
deference from courts than agency regulations, as the cases have
shown. Both Zebley 221 and Shalala22 2 illustrated occasions invalidating "agency regulations challenged as facially inconsistent
with governing statutes despite the presence of easily imaginable
valid applications. '2 23 The argument can be made, however, that
the D.C. Circuit failed to defer, as it should, to the Corps' construction of the ambiguous statutory provision (i.e., section 404) dealing with "addition."224 The construction would therefore have
been of the CWA, not merely a regulation; an agency's statutory
construction in such a situation must receive greater respect than
was shown by the court, as mandated by the Chevron test. The
court chose not to make such an inquiry, and perhaps left an opening for appeal.
Following Supreme Court and federal appellate precedent,
the D.C. Circuit properly held the district court's injunctive authority to be broad, under cases such as Wagner, Harmon, and Lujan.2 25 Moreover, the nationwide injunction was proper for the
reasons the court stated: the ordinary result of the invalidation of
agency regulations "is programmatic relief that affects the rights
of parties not before the court . . . to obviate duplicative litigation." 22 6 The D.C. Circuit consistently followed well-established
219. 904 F.2d 1276 ( 9 th Cir. 1990).
220. See North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
221. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
222. 23 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
223. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1407-08.
224. See North Carolina v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
225. See id. at 1408-09.
226. Id. at 1409.
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precedent in invalidating the over-broad Tulloch Rule, and as a
result, its decision stands on firm ground.
V.

Conclusion: The Need for Legislative Action

As expressed by attorney Howard I. Fox, who represented the
National Wildlife Federation in supporting the Tulloch Rule, expresses, the decision in National Mining Ass'n represents a serious setback for wetlands protection. 22 7 By contrast, Virginia
Albrecht, the attorney who represented National Mining Association, believes the unnecessary and overly strict rule had posed a
major obstacle to legitimate public works departments across the
2 28
country for many years.
Both sides raise legitimate arguments. Among the harms
that could result from the D.C. Circuit's ruling are: loss of the bottomland hardwood wetlands of the Southeast, which would destroy fish and wildlife habitats while reducing water quality and
increasing flooding; wetlands losses in the prairie potholes of the
upper Midwest, which would threaten waterfowl habitats and also
increase flooding while reducing water quality; scraping and
the
scouring of riparian areas throughout the West, destroying
2 29
quality.
water
downstream
and
anadramous fish habitat
The Tulloch Rule had some very beneficial protections, but
also had some illegitimate aspects not permitted under the CWA.
The courts want to protect wetlands, but not at the expense of the
law's legitimacy. Therefore, the court had to deny the Corps' attempt at usurping legislative power, represented in the Tulloch
Rule, because the Corps was and could never be a legislative body.
The Corps must only enforce the laws given it by Congress. This
begs the question: Where are the laws which the Corps needs to
properly protect wetlands, and when will Congress enact them?
In the meantime, the courts must find a middle ground that allows the Corps to adequately regulate and protect wetlands without drastically overstepping its statutory authority under the
CWA. Only in this manner can wetlands be protected in the absence of effective statutory means.

227. See Bureau of National Affairs, Wetlands: Dredge Material FallbackDoes Not
Require Section 404 Permit, 29 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 461 (1998).
228. See id.
229. See Press Release, Court of Appeals Hangs Wetlands Out to Dry, CLEAN
WATER NETWORK (June 19, 1998).
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